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Abstract
We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk
attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised)
confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on
performance. The former procedure reproduces the “hard-easy effect” (underconfidence in easy
tasks and overconfidence in hard tasks) found in a large number of studies using non-
incentivised self-reports. The latter procedure produces general underconfidence, which is
significantly reduced, but not eliminated when we filter out the effects of risk attitudes. Finally,
we find that self-reported confidence correlates significantly with features of individual risk
attitudes including parameters of individual probability weighting.
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11. Introduction
In this paper we report an experiment investigating relationships between measures of
individuals’ confidence assessments of their own performance and their risk attitudes.
Our broad motivation flows from a large literature originating in psychology in the
1970s and documenting apparently systematic biases in individuals’ assessments of their own
abilities, both relative to others and in absolute terms. For example, a classic experimental
approach to eliciting absolute confidence might ask subjects to respond to various quiz
questions with right and wrong answers and then to report assessments of their own
performance (e.g. by responding to questions of roughly the form “how many questions do you
think you got right?” or “how likely is that you got this question right?”). A range of studies
using approaches like this, starting with the classic study of Fischoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein
(1977), document systematic mis-calibration, usually in the form of either overconfidence (i.e.
over-predicting own actual success rate) or a hard-easy effect (i.e. overestimating success for
‘hard’ tasks and underestimating success for ‘easy’ ones).1
This literature has, in turn, stimulated significant streams of work in both empirical and,
more recently, theoretical economics. For example, findings of overconfidence in own
performance relative to that of others (e.g. Svenson 1981) has motivated many studies by
experimental economists on the relationship between relative confidence, relative ability, and
willingness to take risks in strategic environments (e.g. Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Hoelzl &
Rustichini 2005; Moore & Cain 2007; Niederle & Vesterlund 2007). Confidence about own
abilities has been shown to affect many important spheres of economic behaviour including
consumer decision making (Grubb 2015), trading in financial markets (Biais, Hilton, Mazuier
& Pouget 2005; Kent & Hirshleifer 2015), innovative activity (Herz, Schunk & Zehnder 2014),
investment in education (Dunning, Heath & Suls 2004), and decision making among managers
and CEO’s (Malmendier & Tate 2015). Given this, it is not surprising that economists have
shown interest in developing theoretical models to examine the implications of biases in
confidence (e.g. Compte & Postlewaite 2004; Dubra 2004; Gervais, Heaton & Odean 2011;
Ludwig, Wichardt & Wickhorst 2011).2
Our study has two primary motivations. One flows from an apparent clash between
particular stylized findings from the established psychological literature and more recent
1 Other early studies include Lichtenstein & Fischoff (1981) and Lichtenstein, Fischoff & Phillips (1982). See
Keren (1991) or Alba & Hutchinson (2000) for reviews.
2 A related literature in psychology has challenged the interpretation of findings from miscalibration studies,
arguing that observed overconfidence and the hard-easy effect may be partly artefacts of the confidence elicitation
tools and/or methods used to analyse data, rather than biases in individual information-processing (see Olsson
(2014) for a review).
2evidence emerging from experimental economics. We discuss the relevant evidence in more
detail in the next section, but the crucial motivating feature to note is that the recent evidence
from experimental economics has tended to reveal either much less evidence of systematic
miscalibration or strikingly different patterns of miscalibration where it does occur. So, what
might account for this difference? One distinctive feature of much of the newer literature is that
it employs various (financial) incentive mechanisms to motivate revelation of confidence,
whereas the psychology studies tended to rely on non-incentivised self-reported confidence.
So, one possibly tempting, though in fact it will turn out misleading, diagnosis would be that
the newer evidence provides more accurate confidence measurement as a consequence of
incentivised revelation techniques. In this paper, however, we investigate another possibility:
that some of the differences between findings of economists and psychologists may be a
consequence of biases in measured confidence induced by incentive mechanisms which fail to
control for the influence of individual risk attitudes.
Our second motivation is to explore the possibility that confidence judgements may be
intrinsically related to risk attitudes. It seems plausible that there could be a positive
association between individuals being more confident in their own performance and being
more willing to take risks. For example, overconfidence about own abilities and a willingness
to take risks might be common consequences of particular personality traits (e.g. egotism),
emotional states or dispositions (e.g. optimism). While these considerations suggest a possible
linkage between individual confidence assessments and risk attitudes, as far as we know, there
is no existing evidence to support such linkage.
In Section 2, we underpin the two motivations just highlighted with a more detailed
discussion of key aspects of the background experimental literature, with particular focus on
evidence related to assessments of absolute confidence.
Section 3 then introduces our experimental design. This has two core components: one
involves the use of two distinct methods for the elicitation of (absolute) confidence; the other
involves procedures for independently measuring individual risk attitudes. One of our
confidence measurement tools is a non-incentivised tool designed to be analogous to
procedures that have been used extensively in psychological research; the other is an
incentivised choice based procedure. We designed the latter to be incentive compatible for
revelation of confidence for risk neutral subjects but, in common with other incentive
mechanisms that have been used in the recent literature, our procedure will result in biased
confidence measurements for non-risk neutral subjects. Thus, we use elicited risk attitudes to
adjust incentivised confidence measures for departures from risk-neutrality. We also examine
3whether individual risk attitudes predict self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence
judgements. In the implementation of the design (explained in detail in Section 3),
measurement of risk attitudes precedes elicitation of confidence. In presenting the design,
however, we begin by introducing our tools for confidence measurement.
In Section 4 we present our results. There are three primary findings. First, our two
tools produce markedly different patterns of confidence miscalibration, mimicking the stylised
facts of existing research (the non-incentivized tool reproduces the familiar hard-easy effect,
while our incentivised tool reveals general underconfidence). Second, when we filter out the
effects of risk attitudes on incentivised measurements of confidence, we find that measured
miscalibration is much reduced. This shows that incentivised mechanisms for confidence
elicitation can be biased in the absence of suitable controls for risk preferences. Finally, we
find that confidence, as measured by non-incentivized self-reports, correlates significantly with
features of individual risk attitudes including parameters of individual probability weighting
functions. Moreover the directions of association are intuitively plausible: for example,
reported confidence is positively associated with risk parameters that imply greater willingness
to take risk. Section 5 discusses broader implications and concludes.
2. Background literature
In this section, we review dimensions of the literature relating to confidence mis-
calibration which are most closely related to, and motivate, our contribution. Because we are
interested in possible relationships between individuals’ confidence judgements and their risk
attitudes, which we interpret as features of individuals, we focus mainly on evidence related to
the calibration of own absolute performance.3
We begin by looking more closely at our earlier assertion that recent research by
experimental economists has revealed rather different patterns in (absolute) confidence
miscalibration compared to the earlier psychology literature. One of the first papers in
experimental economics to study absolute confidence miscalibration is by Blavatskyy (2009).
In his experiment, subjects answer a set of 10 multiple choice quiz questions before choosing
between two payment schemes. Either one question is selected at random and the subject
receives a payoff if they answered this question correctly, or the subject receives the same
payoff with a stated probability set by the experimenter to be equal to the percentage of
3 In our experiment we focus exclusively on absolute, rather than relative, confidence judgements. Note that
biases in judgements about relative performance may reflect misperceptions about own performance or the
performance of others, and measurement of judgements about relative performance may be complicated by
strategic and/or social comparison concerns. Our focus on absolute confidence avoids such complications.
4correctly answered questions (although the subject does not know this is how the probability is
set). Subjects could also indicate indifference. The majority choose the second payment
scheme which Blavatskyy interprets as reflecting a tendency towards underconfidence. He also
elicits risk attitudes in a separate part of the experiment but finds no significant relationship
between these risk attitudes and choices of payment scheme. In our study, by contrast and as
explained below, we do find significant correlations between risk attitudes and confidence.4
In a related contribution, Urbig, Stauf & Weitzel (2009) elicit confidence about own
performance over a set of 10 multiple choice quiz questions. They use an incentivized
mechanism that elicits confidence via probability equivalents for bets based on own
performance. In their data the average elicited probability equivalent is extremely close to the
actual rate of success. Both Blavatskyy (2009) and Urbig et al. (2009) note the difference
between their findings and those from the earlier psychology literature, and speculate that the
difference may be due to the introduction of incentivized elicitation devices. However, neither
study contains a benchmark treatment for comparing the elicited confidence with a non-
incentivized tool. Our study includes such a comparison.
Clark & Friesen (2009) study subjects’ confidence in relation to two types of real effort
tasks involving verbal and numerical skills. They study forecasts of own performance using
quadratic scoring rule (QSR) incentives and find that underconfidence is more prevalent than
overconfidence. One potential limitation of QSR incentives, however, is that they may result in
biased measurements of confidence if subjects are not risk neutral. Recognizing this Clark &
Friesen use a binary lottery incentive procedure which, for an expected utility maximizer,
induces risk neutrality. However, departures from expected utility theory, for example due to
non-linear probability weighting, may result in the procedure failing to induce risk neutrality
(we return to this point below in more detail).5
A potentially significant feature of the three experiments discussed in the last three
paragraphs is that they all elicit confidence in relation to performance across sets of tasks. By
contrast, much of the earlier psychological literature investigating confidence calibration
assessed it with reference to performance in single tasks. This may be a significant distinction
4 There are various differences between our methodologies that might explain this key difference in findings. For
example, Blavatskyy (2009) does not directly elicit confidence measures, as we do, but rather infers
underconfidence from the choice of payment scheme. As such, his measure of an individual’s confidence is rather
coarse, potentially limiting his analysis of the relation between individual risk attitudes and confidence. Our
measurement of risk attitudes is more detailed and also allows us to distinguish attitudes to consequences and
attitudes to chance.
5 Clark & Friesen (2009) also study forecasts of relative performance and compare (QSR) incentivized forecasts
with non-incentivized forecasts. They find little if any effect of incentives on calibration.
5because there is evidence that miscalibration varies between measurements based on single
versus sets of tasks. For example, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Keinbolting (1991), Liberman
(2004) and Griffin & Brenner (2008) report that when beliefs are elicited about aggregate
performance in sets of tasks most subjects are either well-calibrated or underconfident whereas
overconfidence is evident when elicitation is at the single task level. We study confidence on a
single task level. Hence our evidence is more directly comparable with the original confidence
calibration studies.
Hollard, Massoni & Vergnaud (2015) elicit absolute confidence in relation to single
tasks and compare confidence in visual perception and quiz tasks contrasting three elicitation
tools: non-incentivized self-reports; the QSR; and the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM)
mechanism. They find highest overconfidence in the non-incentivized self-reports followed by
BDM and then QSR. BDM-elicited confidence being higher than QSR-elicited confidence is
consistent with the effects of risk aversion, but since they do not elicit risk attitudes we cannot
tell whether that difference is caused by risk attitudes or something else, such as differences in
understanding of the elicitation procedures. With our methodology we will be able to identify
the extent to which elicited confidence is affected by risk attitudes.
Our study is also related to a growing literature on elicitation of subjective beliefs.
Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen & Wakker (2009), Trautmann & van de Kuilen (2014)
and Andersen, Fountain, Harrison & Rutstrom (2014) elicit subjects’ beliefs about uncertain
events in a two-step process, using estimates of individual risk attitudes to filter out the effect
of risk attitudes from measured beliefs. Our experiment also uses estimated risk attitudes to
filter out the effect of risk attitudes from beliefs but a key difference is that we are concerned
with biases in subjective estimates of confidence in own performance (not biases in
assessments of naturally determined chance events). A second difference from these studies is
that we use the parametric method developed by Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert (2006) to
estimate individual risk attitudes under rank-dependant utility (RDU) theories. This method
gives us a rich measure of risk attitudes which separates attitudes to consequences from
attitudes to probabilities. In our analysis, we use the measured risk attitudes for two distinct
purposes: first, by comparing risk-adjusted to unadjusted confidence we are able to track the
effect of risk attitudes on confidence elicited using our incentivized mechanism; second, by
relating measured risk attitudes to (non-incentivised) self-reported confidence we are able to
test for an intrinsic relationship between confidence and risk attitudes.
Our exploration of the relationship between risk attitudes and confidence connects with
previous studies investigating links between other individual characteristics and confidence.
6Some studies have focused on gender differences and find that overconfidence is more
pronounced among men than women (see Croson & Gneezy 2009 for a discussion of some of
these). However other studies, for example Clark & Friesen (2009), find no gender differences
in confidence. More recently, there has been interest in how personality traits and economic
preferences interact. For example, it has been found that personality traits such as openness and
extraversion predict confidence and overconfidence, respectively (Schaefer, Williams, Goodie
& Campbell 2004); neuroticism and cognitive ability predict risk taking (Rustichini, DeYoung,
Anderson & Burks 2012); and narcissism predicts higher confidence and more willingness to
bet on one’s own performance (Campbell, Goodie & Foster 2004). Becker, Deckers, Dohmen,
Falk & Kosse (2012) review the relationships between economic preferences and psychological
personality traits finding mixed evidence on associations between risk preferences and
personality traits. In their own data, these authors find only weak correlations between risk
preferences and personality traits, and their best model for predicting life outcomes such as
health, earnings and education includes both personality traits and risk preferences. None of
these studies, however, report how risk attitudes correlate with elicited confidence at the
individual level. This is a significant gap which our study seeks to address.
3. Methods
Our experiment had two parts. In the first part, we used a procedure (common across all
subjects, and explained in detail later) to elicit risk attitudes. In the second part, we measured
confidence about own performance in the context of a standard quiz framework, using two
different techniques, which we now explain.
In Part 2 of the experiment, subjects responded to a series of two-item multiple-choice
questions each of which asked them to judge which of a pair of cities had the highest
population. Subjects could earn £0.50 for each correct answer. The quiz is included as
Appendix A.
For each quiz response, we elicited a measure of confidence. We employed two
different procedures for measuring confidence implemented in two treatments in a between
subjects design. In the Reported Confidence treatment, we elicited confidence using a simple
non-incentivised self-report. Our method was as follows: alongside each quiz answer the
subject completed the statement:
"I am ___% confident that my answer is correct".
7In the Inferred Confidence treatment we measured confidence using a new incentivised
procedure. Figure 1 illustrates the tool which has a choice list format.6 At the top of the figure,
the subject has to choose which of two cities has the higher population. They are then required
to complete the table below the quiz question choosing either A or B in each of the 20 rows.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Given the construction of the table, subjects are expected to choose Option B in the first
row and Option A in the last row. At some point they will likely switch from option B to A,
and this switchpoint is used to measure their confidence in their answer. For example, suppose
a subject thinks she has a 67% chance of being correct. Her expected earnings from option A
are £6.70 and so if she wants to maximise her expected earnings she should switch from B to A
at row 8. We will refer to these switchpoints as certainty equivalents (CE) and under expected
value maximisation (EV) the CE can be interpreted as revealing an individual’s subjective
probability of success ( 2.5%).
More generally, the CE picks up some mix of assessment of their chances of success
with (possibly several) aspects of risk attitudes including non-linear attitudes to consequences
and probabilities. For example, if the subject is a risk averse expected utility maximiser she
will switch at a later row. If we were to incorrectly assume that this subject makes choices
according to the EV model, we would interpret this later switchpoint as indicating a lower
subjective probability of success. In this case our estimate of the subject’s confidence would be
biased and, even if the individual is perfectly calibrated in that her subjective probability
accurately reflects her underlying performance, we would incorrectly record underconfidence.
Similarly, if choices are made based on non-linear attitudes to probabilities, we would obtain
biased measures of confidence if we were to infer confidence through the lens of a model that
fails to incorporate these attitudes, and as a result we would attribute systematic miscalibration
to well-calibrated subjects.
To allow for non-linear attitudes to consequences and/or probabilities we infer
confidence from CE’s using one of the most common and parsimonious specifications for risk
preferences, Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) theory. Under RDU, there should be a unique
6 A choice list elicitation procedure was used as early as Cohen, Jaffray & Said (1987) to elicit risk preferences.
Andersen, Harrison, Lau & Rutstrom (2006) and Isoni, Loomes & Sugden (2011) extensively discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of using choice lists as elicitation tools. We use choice lists mainly because of the
clear interpretable framework of the decision environment (the value of betting on one’s own answer) and the
relative ease with which subjects may see that truthful revelation is in their best interest.
8switchpoint at which the utility of the certainty equivalent will be (approximately) equal to the
value of the lottery. 7 Hence, under the RDU model (which contains expected utility and
expected value theories as special cases) we may write:
ܷ(ܥܧ௜) = ܷ(£10)ݓ(ܥ݋݊ ௜݂) + ܷ(£0)൫1 − ݓ(ܥ݋݊ ௜݂)൯ (1)
where CEi is an individual’s certainty equivalent for question i, U(.) is a utility function defined
on money payoffs and w(.) is an RDU probability weighting function. In expression (1) we
treat confidence as a subjective probability judgement that underlies choices, but may be prone
to biases and miscalibration. The function w(.) is then interpreted as capturing attitudes to
chance distinct from miscalibration.8 Rearranging equation (1) we obtain the probability that a
subject assigns to being correct in question i, denotedܥ݋݊ ௜݂, as:
ܥ݋݊ ௜݂= ݓ ିଵቀ௎(஼ா೔)ି௎ (͉ ଴)௎ (͉ ଵ଴)ି௎( ͉ ଴)ቁ (2)
Under the EV model both the value function and the probability weighting function are linear
so confidence can be inferred directly from an observed CE as Confi = CEi/10. Estimation
under the RDU model requires knowledge of both the utility function and the probability
weighting function.
Part 1 of the experiment required subjects to make a series of lottery choices, from
which we estimate individual risk attitudes in the form of their utility and probability weighting
functions. We use these estimates to filter out the effects of risk attitudes on elicited
confidence in our incentivized procedure and to study the relationship between individual
confidence and risk attitude. For the purpose of estimating ܷ(. ) and ݓ(. ), we use a simple and
easy to understand procedure introduced in Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert (2006) and
successfully employed to estimate utility function and probability weighting function
parameters in several subsequent studies (including: Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper 2010; Fehr-
Duda, Bruhin, Epper & Schubert 2010; and Epper, Fehr-Duda & Bruhin 2011). Because it uses
a choice list elicitation task which is very similar in structure to our incentivised confidence
elicitation task, it is particularly well suited to our study as its use minimises the cognitive load
involved in subjects learning how to respond to the two types of task.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
7 For compactness, the discussion now proceeds as if CE is revealed accurately by our procedure but the reader
should keep in mind that there is, of course, an element of approximation.
8 In the literature on prospect theory, probability weights are sometimes interpreted as reflecting misperception of
underlying probabilities, sometimes reflecting subjective attitudes to chance, and sometimes a mixture of the two.
For discussion and a formalisation following the latter mixed approach, see Abdellaoui, L’Haridon & Paraschiv
(2011). For a thorough discussion of prospect theoretic models see Wakker (2010).
9The procedure requires each subject to complete 25 tables of the form given in Figure 2. Each
table consists of 20 rows, where each row is a choice between a two-outcome lottery and a
guaranteed amount of money, with the guaranteed amount of money decreasing from the high
outcome to the low outcome of the lottery in equal increments moving down the rows. The
subject’s certainty equivalent, ܥܧ௅, of lottery L can be written as in (3), where the high prize of
the lottery ݔଵ௅occurs with probability ݌ଵ௅ and the low prize of the lottery ݔଶ௅ occurs otherwise:
ܷ(ܥܧ௅) = ܷ(ݔଵ௅)ݓ(݌ଵ௅) + ܷ(ݔଶ௅)൫1 − ݓ(݌ଵ௅)൯. (3)
We use the switching point from choosing the guaranteed amount (Option B) to the lottery ܮ
(Option A) as our estimate of the subject’s certainty equivalent of the lottery. The 25 lotteries
are summarized in Table 1 and were adapted from Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert (2006).
[Insert Table 1 around here]
To estimate ܷ(. ) and w(. ) we first specify functional forms for utility and probability
weighting functions. We follow Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, & Epper (2010) in their choice of flexible
and interpretable functions which have been widely used elsewhere in the empirical literature.
On this basis we use the power form for the utility function:
ܷ(ݔ) = ݔఈ . (4)
This specification is parsimonious in modelling risk attitudes via a single curvature parameter,
ߙ, and has been shown to provide a good fit to a wide range of choice data. To allow for non-
linear probability weighting in the estimation of RDU parameters, we use the linear-in-log-
odds function of Goldstein & Einhorn (1987):
ݓ(݌) = ఉ௣ം
ఉ௣ംା(ଵି௣)ം . (5)
This specification is credited with providing a good account of individual heterogeneity (Wu,
Zhang & Gonzalez 2004) and its two parameters have the advantage of having clear intuitive
interpretations (Lattimore, Baker & Witte 1992; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper 2010): the
parameter ߚ captures ‘elevation’ of the probability weighting function (with greater ߚ
reflecting more ‘optimism’); the parameter ߛ controls curvature (for ߛ< 1, the smaller is ߛ, the
stronger is the deviation from linearity).
Finally, operationalizing the model requires specification of some stochastic element in
the decision process. Following Epper, Fehr-Duda & Bruhin (2011) we assume that the
observed switching point, ܥܧ෢ ௅, is given by:
ܥܧ෢ ௅ = ܥܧ௅ + ௅߳, (6)
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where the error terms, ௅߳, are independent draws from a normal distribution with zero mean.
Heteroskedasticity in the error variance across elicitation tables is accounted for, as in Fehr-
Duda, Bruhin & Epper (2011), by assuming the standard deviation of the distribution of the
error term, ݒ௅, is proportional to the difference between the guaranteed amounts in option B as
one moves down the rows of the table. Hence, ݒ௅ = ݒ(ݔଵ௅− ݔଶ௅) , where ݒ denotes an
additional parameter to be estimated. The normalized standard deviation ݒ, and the parameters
of U(.) and w(.) are then obtained by maximum likelihood estimation.
To summarise our setup, in Part 1 we elicited risk attitudes (i.e. utility and probability
weighting parameters) for every subject, using versions of Figure 2 and the parameter sets of
Table 1. These tasks were identical for all subjects except that the order of tasks was
randomized across subjects. In Part 2 we elicited confidence, varying the way we did this
across two between-subject treatments. In the Reported Confidence treatment we used simple,
non-incentivized self-reports. In the Inferred Confidence treatment we used Figure 1 and
equation (2), using the elicited risk attitudes from Part 1 for measuring confidence under
RDU.9
After answering all quiz questions and providing their confidence levels (either by
reporting or filling in the table), subjects completed a questionnaire while we checked their
answers. Via this questionnaire, we elicited a variety of things including demographic
information and a basic measure of ambiguity attitudes using a simple (non-incentivized)
version of Ellsberg’s (1961) urn problems. 10 Details of the questionnaire are provided in
Appendix B. At the end of the experiment, we used a random incentive system to pay
subjects.11 Subjects were paid based on one randomly drawn row in one randomly drawn table
in one randomly drawn part of the experiment. We used physical objects (dice, numbered balls
and poker chips) to make the independence of the randomization devices salient, and we
explained the randomization procedures with simple examples and diagrams.
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham, CeDEx lab in 2011.
Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). In total 86 subjects participated; 40 in
the Inferred Confidence treatment (25 male), and 46 in the Reported Confidence treatment (23
male). The experiment was conducted in pen and paper format with subjects seated in cubicles.
9 We did not randomize the order of risk and confidence elicitations since we wanted to ensure a common
experience prior to confidence measurement across treatments.
10 We included a basic tool for classifying subjects according to ambiguity attitudes because we conjectured that
such attitudes might play some role in responses to our confidence elicitation tasks. We found no evidence to
support this, however. Summary statistics of the ambiguity data are reported in Appendix B.
11 The random incentive system is a widely used experimental procedure. For a discussion of its rationale and
possible limitations see Bardsley et al. (2010).
11
The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour and the average payment to participants was £9.
The full experimental instructions are available on request.
4. Results
We structure the results under three subheadings. In Section 4.1, we compare and
contrast the data on average confidence elicited in the two treatments. In Section 4.2, we
present our findings on individual risk attitudes and risk-adjusted confidence. Finally, in
Section 4.3, we examine the relationship between risk attitudes and reported confidence.12
4.1. Reproducing Standard Results
Figure 3 provides a quick eye-balling tool for comparing confidence measured using
non-incentivized self-reports with confidence elicited using our incentivised mechanism (on
the assumption that individuals are risk neutral). Consider first the top left panel. This plots, for
each quiz question, the mean of reported confidence against the average success rate. The 45-
degree line provides a natural benchmark in the sense that a general tendency towards
overconfidence would result in points located above the line whereas a general tendency
towards underconfidence would result in points below it.13
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
The reported confidence data have a pattern consistent with the familiar ‘hard-easy
effect’. To highlight this, we have drawn a vertical (dashed) line through the question which is
the median in terms of its success rate (at around 68%). If we define ‘hard’ (‘easy’) questions
as those with lower (higher) than median success rates it is then apparent that, on average, there
is overconfidence for all but one of the hard questions and underconfidence for all of the easy
ones. For each question we measure miscalibration bias as average confidence minus the
proportion of correct answers. We then test whether the mean of the distribution of biases is
equal to zero using a simple t-test. For easy questions there is significant underconfidence
(average bias = -0.115, p = 0.002) while for hard questions there is significant overconfidence
(average bias = 0.070, p = 0.001). Pooling hard and easy questions we cannot reject the null of
12 Before proceeding with the analysis, we dropped the data for four quiz questions that were potentially
misleading because the success rate on each of these questions was less than 40% (whereas reported confidence
judgements were constrained to the interval 50-100%; see Appendix A). We also excluded data from tables where
subjects switched on one row and then switched back again at a later row. Reassuringly, however, less than 2% of
the tables of Part 1 and no table in Part 2 included such non-monotonic responses.
13 Histograms of (average subject level) reported and inferred confidence are also presented in Appendix C.
12
zero expected bias (average bias = -0.027, p = 0.312), evidently because the negative bias on
easy questions offsets the positive bias on hard questions.
The top right panel of Figure 3 provides corresponding analysis for confidence inferred
from our incentivised elicitation tool, but on the assumption that individuals are expected value
maximizers. We refer to this measure as ConfEVi and, from expression 2 above, it is easy to see
that this can be calculated directly from an individual’s switchpoint in any given table because
ConfEVi = CEi/10. Here, all of the observations sit below the 45-degree line indicating a
systematic and highly significant tendency towards underconfidence (average bias = -0.212, p
= 0.000).
The bottom two panels provide corresponding analysis, but in this case, each dot
represents a single subject with each individual’s average reported confidence across tasks
plotted against their actual success rate. For the Reported Confidence treatment, individuals
with less than median success rate are overconfident (p = 0.085) and individuals with more
than median success rate are underconfident (p = 0.041). For the Inferred Confidence
treatment, across all individuals, there is general underconfidence (p = 0.000).
Taken together, the results presented in Figure 3 reproduce the standard pattern of
findings that motivated our study: using a procedure based on non-incentivised self-reports of
confidence, similar to those used in a range of psychological studies, we reproduce a hard-easy
effect; in contrast, using an incentivised procedure to elicit confidence we find a marked
tendency towards underconfidence.
4.2. Risk Preferences and Risk-Filtered Confidence
As explained above, if individuals have non-linear utility or probability weighting
functions then confidence measures elicited via our incentivised mechanism will, in part,
reflect risk attitudes. This section takes account of this possibility by implementing analysis to
filter out the effects of risk attitudes on our incentivised confidence measures.
To this end, we exploit the data from Part 1 of the experiment to fit risk preference
models separately for each individual. As described in Section 3, we do this using one of the
leading models of risk preference, rank-dependent utility theory (RDU). We estimate four
parameters per experimental subject: the three parameters of the RDU model (ߙ, ߚ , ߛ)
assuming the power utility function (equation 4) and the linear-in-log-odds probability
weighting function (equation 5); plus the normalized standard deviation of the decision errors
(ݒ). We omit discussion of the error distribution parameter from the results since this is not
central to our analysis.
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Figure 4 summarises the results from fitting these models to individuals in our
(‘Nottingham’) study; as a benchmark for our estimates we also report parameters obtained by
applying the same econometric method to the data reported in Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper
(2010) and Epper, Fehr-Duda & Bruhin (2011) (these are labelled the ‘Zurich’ estimates). The
results for Nottingham and Zurich are, qualitatively, very similar. The mean of the utility
function parameter distribution is close to one and for most of the Nottingham subjects (67 out
of 86) we cannot reject the null hypothesis thatߙ = 1 at the 5% level of significance (two-
tailed test). Based on the same test procedure, however, for a very large majority of subjects we
do reject linearity of the probability weighting function: for roughly half the subjects (44 of 86)
we reject ߚ = 1; for 78 out of 86 subjects we reject ߛ= 1 and for all except four subjects we
reject the joint hypothesis that ߚ = ߛ= 1.
The graph presented in Figure 4 plots the probability weighting function based on the
median estimates of ߚ and ߛof the sample. The Nottingham and Zurich plots both display the
inverse-S shape which overweights (underweights) small (large) probabilities; this is quite
typical of the broader empirical literature estimating probability weighting functions, at least
for data gathered from tasks with stated (as opposed to learned) probabilities (for a review see
Starmer 2000; Fehr-Duda, Gennaro & Schubert 2006). This correspondence between our
estimates and those obtained in Zurich provides some reassurance that our procedures for
estimating the risk preference measures are reliable (or at least comparably reliable to those
based on similar procedures elsewhere in the literature).14
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The significant non-linearity in utility and probability weighting functions for the
majority of our subjects strongly suggests that risk attitudes will be a component of confidence
measured via ConfEVi. Also notice that from the bottom right panel of Figure 3 it is apparent
that ConfEVi < 0.5 for a significant proportion of individuals (47.5%). Given that each task
involved a choice between two options, one of which was right, confidence below 50% is
implausibly low. In our incentivised task, however, risk aversion (say as measured by
concavity of the utility function) would tend to depress ConfEVi. In other words, the data
obtained from our incentivised mechanism might seem more plausible were we to filter out the
effect of departures from risk neutrality.
14 Histograms of the estimated parameters can be found in Appendix D.
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Using the independent measures of individuals’ risk parameters (based on responses to
Part 1 of the experiment) we estimate risk-adjusted measures of inferred confidence, based on
expression (2) above, as follows:
ܥ݋݊ ோ݂஽௎೔ = ݓ ିଵቀቀ஼ா೔ଵ଴ቁఈೃವೆቁ= ଵ
൬ఉ∗ቀ
಴ಶ
భబ
ቁ
షഀ
ିఉ൰
భ
ം
ାଵ
(7)
The results of filtering out risk in this way are shown in Figure 5. This plots inferred
confidence against actual success rates for each question, with separate panels for the EV and
RDU models. For comparison, we also reproduce the reported confidence in the bottom panel.
We observe that (i) the extent of underconfidence falls as we move from EV to RDU (p =
0.025), (ii) the difference between mean biases of reported and inferred confidence decreases
as we filter out risk attitudes (p = 0.023), and (iii) inferred confidence is significantly more
noisy than reported confidence (Levene (1960) variance equality test: p = 0.009). These results
suggest that, in the absence of filters for risk attitude, the extent of underconfidence is
exaggerated. By filtering out components of these measures attributable to risk attitudes, the
overall mean bias falls from -0.212 (inferred confidence under EV) to -0.086 (inferred
confidence under RDU).
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
While confidence miscalibration is reduced as a consequence of allowing for risk
attitudes, it is not eliminated and the mean (underconfidence) bias remains significant for both
measures of inferred confidence. Averaging across questions, subjects’ success rates are 8.6
percentage points higher than their inferred confidences under our RDU specification. For
comparison, success rates are 2.7 percentage points higher than reported confidence.
Note, however, that zero bias does not imply perfect calibration. If, as in the bottom
panel of Figure 5, bias is positive for hard questions and negative for easy questions, the
average bias measure may not reveal the extent of miscalibration. Thus, for a different overall
measure of miscalibration we use the average absolute bias (i.e. the sum of vertical deviations
from the 45-degree line). On this measure, inferred RDU confidence (11.6%) and reported
confidence (10.2%) are not significantly different (p = 0.666).
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4.3. Relationship between Reported Confidence and Risk Attitudes
So far we have focussed on the relation between risk attitudes and measured confidence
elicited via an incentivised mechanism. Next we explore a possible connection between risk
attitudes and self-reported confidence. It seems plausible to suppose that confidence might be
related to risk attitudes. For example, some popular contemporary theories of risk preference
can be interpreted as allowing some departures from risk neutrality to arise as consequences of
the way that people assess and/or respond to probabilities. For example, prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1992) can be interpreted as allowing for
both misperception of objective probabilities and subjective attitudes to whatever probabilities
are perceived. To the extent that such processes reflect generic properties of the way that
humans perceive and respond to risks, that provides reason to expect that similar processes
might operate in relation to confidence judgements because those judgments are assessments
of probabilities. We investigate this possibility by examining the correlation between
individual level risk parameters and reported confidence. Notice that, whereas we have a
reason to believe that ConfEV and ConfRDU may be correlated with risk attitudes because of an
influence introduced via the measurement technique, in the case of reported confidence, there
is no such transmission mechanism. As such, a correlation between risk attitudes and reported
confidence would be suggestive of an intrinsic link between confidence and risk attitudes.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is average
reported confidence (subject level). The table reports two model specifications. Model 1 uses
estimated RDU parameters as regressors, and Model 2 includes additional controls for average
success rates, demographic variables and the measure of ambiguity aversion elicited from the
questionnaire. Since some of the regressors are estimated, we use bootstrapped standard errors
to account for measurement error in the independent variables.
Estimates of Model 2 show no significant association between average reported
confidence levels and average success rates across subjects. 15 None of the other control
variables have any significant predictive power for confidence levels. Turning to the risk
15 The lack of a significant effect may reflect low power due to our relatively limited sample size. We also
checked the relation between confidence and success in a more disaggregate analysis using responses to each
question (rather than averages) as the dependent variable. In this analysis, there is a positive and significant
association between success and expressed confidence levels; confidence is about 8.5% higher when a subject’s
answer to a question is correct. This relationship fades away in average subject-level analysis which is consistent
with the findings by e.g. Kruger & Dunning (1999) and Massoni & Roux (2012).
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parameter estimates, curvature of the utility function is positively related to reported
confidence levels in both specifications, with greater risk seeking (as captured by higher
ߙ) associated with higher confidence. We do not find a robust significant effect of the
probability weighting elevation parameter ߚ.16 The significant positive effect of ߛ in both
specifications has a natural interpretation. Recall that ߛ controls curvature of the weighting
function, then notice that, for our tasks, success rates are such that we are typically operating in
a region where the median subject’s weighting function underweights probabilities. In this
region, increases in ߛ reduce underweighting. Hence, the positive sign here is consistent with a
positive association between underweighting and underconfidence.17 We believe the analysis in
this section is novel, and scientifically interesting, suggesting the possibility of common
psychological mechanisms underpinning risk attitudes and confidence judgements.
5. Discussion
There is a very large empirical literature investigating confidence judgements and much
of this points to the presence of overconfidence in a range of judgements or the existence of a
hard-easy effect. The bulk of this literature, however, rests on data generated from non-
incentivised self-reports of confidence and, more recently, the robustness of conclusions from
this line of research has been challenged by studies from experimental economists which use
incentivised tasks to elicit confidence judgements and find that overconfidence is considerably
reduced. Indeed, in these recent studies, underconfidence is the typical finding.
Our study contributes to this literature, and its central novelty lies in combining two key
design features. First, we compare miscalibration of confidence in own absolute performance
across incentivised and non-incentivised confidence elicitation tasks. Second, our design
incorporates procedures for measuring the risk attitudes of our participants coupled with
techniques that allow us to track how filtering out risk attitudes affects the measurement of
confidence via the incentivised procedure. With the data generated from our design, we are
16 In Table 2 we report our most parsimonious model, using just the risk attitude variables, and our most general
model. We also examined intermediate cases excluding some of the questionnaire variables. We found that the
significant effects captured by ߙ and ߛ are robust across model specifications, but the effect captured by β is
sensitive to model specification. For example, if the gender dummy is excluded from Model 2, β becomes
significantly positive at the 5% level. Lack of significance in this specification may also reflect low power due to
our modest sample size.
17 We also examined the relationship between reported confidence and another simple proxy for risk attitudes
represented as the individual’s average switch point (ASP) in Part 1 of the experiment. This revealed significant
positive association between ASP and reported confidence consistent with higher confidence for less risk averse
individuals. Notice that this ASP measure of risk attitude does not rely on any particular model of risk preference.
Results of this analysis is reported in Table E1 of Appendix E.
17
also able to investigate a possible link between reported confidence and risk attitudes at the
individual level.
Using a non-incentivised procedure, designed to be very similar to those used in much
of the background psychology literature, we reproduce the standard finding of a hard-easy
effect. With our new incentivised confidence measurement, regardless of whether or not we
filter for risk attitudes, and in line with the recent experimental economics literature, we
observe a general tendency towards underconfidence and the hard-easy effect disappears.
Our primary novel findings then relate to the impacts of risk aversion on measured
confidence. In the context of incentivised confidence elicitation, we find that filtering out risk
attitudes from inferred confidence reduces the degree of underconfidence. We also observe a
striking association between risk attitudes inferred from incentivised decisions about lotteries
and confidence measured using the non-incentivized tool. Specifically, individuals who are
more risk averse tend to express lower confidence.
As far as we know, we are the first to provide direct evidence that risk attitudes play a
significant role in determining confidence judgements. While we have argued that some such
connection is intuitively plausible, the fact that the association appears to work through both
attitudes to consequences and attitudes to chance is striking: in our data confidence is
associated with parameters of both the utility function and the probability weighting function.
In our view the discovery of an association between probability weighting and confidence is
particularly intriguing. To those who tend to think of probability weighting as reflecting more
general underlying principles of cognition, the manifestation of those principles in another
domain will be reassuring but not, perhaps, especially surprising. We suspect, however, that
many economists previously aware of evidence of probability weighting may, quite
reasonably, think of it as an essentially empirical regularity derived, mainly, from observing
choices among simple gambles, with stated probabilities. To those who do interpret it in this,
more limited, way our results are arguably much more surprising by establishing a clear
empirical connection between responses to probabilities in two very different domains: one
involving attachment of certainty equivalents to gambles with stated probabilities (Part 1 of
our experiment); the other involving self-reported probability judgements about one's own
success rate in a given question (Part 2 of our experiment). We suggest that the ability of
measured (non-linear) probability weighting to predict behaviour in these very different tasks
and domains is a positive signal of the explanatory scope and significance of the concept of
probability weighting within economics.
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Given this association between probability weighting and confidence judgements, it is
natural to ask whether other ‘non-standard’ aspects of preference in relation to risk or
uncertainty might also co-vary with confidence judgements. In this respect, an obvious
candidate to consider is ambiguity aversion, particularly since confidence judgments appear to
be intrinsically ambiguous (as opposed to risky). Although this raises issues beyond the
boundaries of the present study, our post-experimental questionnaire did include a task
intended to assess attitudes to ambiguity. Using these data we found that subjects identified as
ambiguity averse did not switch differently in the confidence elicitation tables compared to
ambiguity neutral subjects. Nor did we find any relationship between ambiguity attitudes and
self-reported confidence. This is, of course, far from conclusive evidence that there is no
relationship to discover, and there is certainly scope for further research into this issue and the
broader question - previously highlighted by Hoelzl & Rustichini (2005), Offerman et al.
(2009) and Kothiyal, et al. (2011) - of how to assess and control the potential impact of
ambiguity attitudes in the context of incentivised belief elicitation.
We conclude with a brief cautionary remark. Whether or not people’s confidence
judgements are well calibrated is clearly an important issue in a range of economically relevant
field contexts (Harrison & Phillips, 2014). As such, economists have, understandably, shown
an interest in the large volume of evidence supporting overconfidence in the lab and field.
While it seems entirely appropriate to analyse the consequences of confidence miscalibration, it
now looks naïve to proceed, as some have done in the past, by simply assuming overconfidence
as a reasonable empirical assumption (Odean 1999; Compte & Postlewaite 2004; Malmendier
& Tate 2005; Galasso & Simcoe 2011; Gervais, Heaton & Odean 2011). In contrast, our
results, alongside other recent work (e.g., Hoelzl & Rustichini 2005; Moore & Healy 2008;
Blavatskyy 2009; Clark & Friesen 2009; Merkle & Weber 2011), support the following
conclusion: while miscalibration of confidence judgements occurs and persists in controlled
incentivised decisions, there is currently – and perhaps ironically – apparent overconfidence
regarding the empirical significance of overconfidence. We hope that our work provides a
helpful input to recalibration.
19
References
Abdellaoui, M., L'Haridon, O., & Paraschiv, C. (2011). “Experienced vs. Described
Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?” Management Science,
Vol. 57, pp.1879-1895.
Alba J. W. & Hutchinson J. W. (2000). “Knowledge Calibration: What Consumers Know and
What They Think They Know”, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 27, pp. 123-156.
Andersen, S., Fountain, J., Harrison, G. W., & Rutström, E. E. (2014). “Estimating Subjective
Probabilities”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 48, pp. 207-229.
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. & Rutstrom, E. E. (2006). “Elicitation Using
Multiple Price List Formats”, Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 383-405.
Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moffat, P., Starmer, C. & Sugden, R.
(2010). “Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules”. Princeton University Press.
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2012). “The Relationship Between
Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Measures”, Annual Review of
Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 453-478
Biais, B., Hilton, D., Mazurier, K. & Pouget, S. (2005). “Judgemental Overconfidence, Self-
Monitoring, and Trading Performance in an Experimental Financial Market”, Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 72, pp. 287-312.
Blavatskyy, P. (2009). “Betting on Own Knowledge: Experimental Test of Overconfidence”,
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 38, pp. 39-49.
Bruhin, A., Fehr-Duda, H. & Epper, T. (2010). “Risk and Rationality: Uncovering
Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion”, Econometrica, Vol. 78, No.4, pp.1375-1412.
Camerer, C. & Lovallo, D. (1999). “Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental
Approach”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 306-318.
Campbell, W. K., Goodie, A. S. & Foster, J. D. (2004). “Narcissism, Confidence, and Risk
Attitude”, Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, Vol. 17, pp. 297-311.
Clark, J. & Friesen, L. (2009). “Overconfidence in Forecasts of Own Performance: an
Experimental Study”, The Economic Journal, Vol.119, pp. 229 - 251.
Cohen, M., Jaffray, J. Y., & Said, T. (1987). “Experimental Comparison of Individual Behavior
under Risk and under Uncertainty for Gains and for Losses.” Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 39, pp. 1-22.
Compte, O. & Postlewaite, A. (2004). “Confidence-Enhanced Performance”, The American
Economic Review, Vol. 94, pp. 1536-1557.
20
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U.. (2009). “Gender Differences in Preferences”, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 47, pp. 448–474.
Dubra, J. (2004). “Optimism and Overconfidence in Search”, Review of Economic Dynamics,
Vol. 7, pp. 198-218.
Dunning, D., Heath, C. & Suls, J. M. (2004). “Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for
Health, Education, and the Workplace”, Psychological Science in the Public Interest,
Vol. 5, pp. 69–106.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms", The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 75, pp. 643-669.
Epper, T., Fehr-Duda, H. & Bruhin, A. (2011). “Viewing the Future through a Warped Lens:
Why Uncertainty Generates Hyperbolic Discounting”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Vol. 43, pp. 169-203.
Fehr-Duda, H., Bruhin, A., Epper, T. & Schubert, R. (2010). “Rationality on the Rise: Why
Relative Risk Aversion Increases with Stake Size”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Vol. 40, pp. 147-180.
Fehr-Duda, H., de Gennaro, M. & Schubert, R. (2006). “Gender, Financial Risk and
Probability Weights”, Theory and Decision, Vol. 60, pp. 283-313.
Fischoff, B., Slovic, P. & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). “Knowing with Certainty: The
Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, Vol. 3, pp. 552-564.
Galasso, A. & Simcoe, T. S. (2011). “CEO Overconfidence and Innovation”, Management
Science, Vol. 57, pp. 1469-1484.
Gervais, S., Heaton, J.B. & Odean, T. (2011). “Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts and
Capital Budgeting”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 66, pp. 1735-1777.
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U. & Kleinbolting, H. (1991). “Probabilistic Mental Models: A
Brunswikian Theory of Confidence”, Psychological Review, Vol. 98, pp. 506-528.
Goldstein, W.M. & Einhorn, H.J. (1987). “Expression Theory and the Preference Reversal
Phenomena”, Psychological Review, Vol. 94, pp. 236-254.
Greiner, B. (2004). An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. In: Kurt
Kremer, Volker Macho (Eds.): Göttingen :Ges. fürsWiss. Datenverarbeitung, pp. 79-93.
Griffin, D. & Brenner, L. (2008). “Perspectives on Probability Judgment Calibration”, in
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (eds D. J. Koehler and N.
Harvey), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Malden, MA, USA, pp. 177-199.
21
Grubb, M.D. (2015) “Overconfident Consumers in the Marketplace” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 29, pp. 9-36.
Harrison, G. W., & Phillips, R. D. (2014). “Subjective Beliefs and Statistical Forecasts of
Financial Risks: The Chief Risk Officer Project”. in T.J. Andersen (ed.) Contemporary
Challenges in Risk Management (New York, Palgrave Macmillan).
Herz, H., Schunk, D. & Zehnder, C. (2014). “How Do Judgmental Overconfidence and
Overoptimism Shape Innovative Activity?” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 83,
pp. 1-23.
Hoelzl, E. & Rustichini, A. (2005). “Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money on It?” The
Economic Journal, Vol. 115, pp. 305-318.
Hollard G., Massoni S. & Vergnaud J.C. (2015). “In search of good probability assessors: an
experimental comparison of elicitation rules for confidence judgments”, Theory and
Decision, forthcoming.
Isoni, A., Loomes, G. & Sugden, R. (2011). “The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept
Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures
for Eliciting Valuations: Comment”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 101, pp.
991-1011.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”,
Econometrica, Vol. 47, pp. 263–91.
Kent, D. & Hirshleifer, D. (2015) “Overconfident Investors, Predictable Returns, and
Excessive Trading”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, pp. 61-88.
Keren, G. (1991). “Calibration and Probability Judgements: Conceptual and Methodological
Issues”, Acta Psychologica, Vol. 77, pp. 217-273.
Kothiyal, A., Spinu, V., & Wakker P.P. (2011). “Comonotonic Proper Scoring Rules to
Measure Ambiguity and Subjective Beliefs”, Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision
Analysis, Vol. 17, pp. 101-113.
Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (1999). “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments”, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 77, pp. 1121-1134.
Lattimore, P. K., Baker, J. R., & Witte, A. D. (1992). “The Influence of Probability on Risky
Choice: A Parametric Examination”, Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, Vol. 17, pp. 377-400.
Levene, H. (1960). “Robust Tests for Equality of Variances”, in Contributions to Probability
and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Harold Hotelling, ed. I. Olkin, S. G. Ghurye, W.
22
Hoeffding, W. G. Madow, and H. B. Mann, 278-292. Menlo Park, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Liberman, V. (2004). “Commentary: Local and Global Judgements of Confidence”, Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, Vol. 30, pp. 729-732.
Lichtenstein, S. & B. Fischoff (1981). “The Effects of Gender and Instructions on Calibration”,
Decision Research Technical Report 81-5, Decision Research, Eugene, OR.
Lichtenstein, S., B. Fischoff & L. D. Phillips (1982). “Calibration of Probabilities: The State of
the Art to 1980”, in D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds), Judgment Under
Uncertainty): Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge Press. Cambridge. MA. pp. 306-334.
Ludwig, S., Wichardt, P. C., & Wickhorst, H. (2011). “Overconfidence can improve an agent's
relative and absolute performance in contests”, Economics Letters, Vol. 110, pp. 193-
196.
Malmendier, U. & Tate, G. (2005). “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment”, Journal
of Finance, Vol. 60, pp. 2661-2700.
Malmendier, U. & Tate, G. (2015). “Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial
Overconfidence” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, pp. 37-60.
Massoni, S. & Roux, N. (2012). “Optimal Group Decision: A Matter of Confidence
Calibration”, Working Paper, CES Paris.
Merkle, C. & Weber, M. (2011). “True Overconfidence: The Inability of Rational Information
Processing to Account for Apparent Overconfidence”, Organizational Behaviour and
Human Decision Processes, Vol. 116, pp. 262-271.
Moore, D. A. & Cain, D. M. (2007). “Overconfidence and Underconfidence: When and Why
People Underestimate (and Overestimate) the Competition”, Organizational Behaviour
and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 103, pp. 197-213.
Moore, D. & Healy P. J. (2008). “The Trouble with Overconfidence”, Psychological Review,
Vol. 115, pp. 502-517.
Niederle, M. & Vesterlund, L. (2007). “Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men
Compete too Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, pp. 1067-1101.
Odean, T. (1999). “Do Investors Trade Too Much?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 89,
pp. 1279-1298.
Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J., van de Kuilen, G. & Wakker, P. (2009). “A Truth Serum for
Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes”, The Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 76, pp. 1461-1489.
23
Olsson, H. (2014). “Measuring Overconfidence: Methodological Problems and Statistical
Artifacts.” Journal of Business Research, Vol. 67, pp. 1766-1770.
Rustichini, A., De Young, C. G., Anderson, J. & Burks, S. V. (2012). “Towards the Integration
of Personality Theory in the Explanation of Economic and Health Behavior”, IZA
Discussion Paper Series No. 6750.
Schaefer, P. S., Williams, C. C., Goodie, A. S. & Campbell, W. K. (2004). “Overconfidence
and the Big Five”, Journal of Research in Personality, Vol. 38, pp. 473-480.
Starmer, C. (2000). “Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a
Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38,
pp. 332-382.
Svenson, O. (1981). “Are We All Less Risky and More Skilful than Our Fellow Drivers?” Acta
Psychologica, Vol. 47, pp. 143-148.
Trautmann, S. T., & van de Kuilen, G. (2014). “Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth
Serums”. The Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty”, Journal of Risk Uncertainty, Vol. 5, pp. 297–323.
Urbig, D., Stauf, J. & Weitzel, U. (2009). “What is Your Level of Overconfidence? A Strictly
Incentive Compatible Measurement of Absolute and Relative Overconfidence”,
Discussion Paper Series 09-20, Utrecht School of Economics.
Wakker, P. P. (2010). “Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity”, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Wu, G., Zhang, J., & Gonzalez, R. (2004). “Decision under Risk”, in The Blackwell Handbook
of Judgment and Decision Making, ed. by D. Koehler and N. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 399–423.
24
Figures
Which of the following cities has the larger population?
□ City X □ City Y
Tick one of the boxes to indicate your answer.
In each row of the table choose either Option A or B.
Row Option A:Lottery
Your Choice Option B:
Guaranteed
AmountA B
1
You get £10.00 if
your city choice is
correct and £0.00 if
not
□ □ £10.00
2 □ □ £9.50
3 □ □ £9.00
4 □ □ £8.50
5 □ □ £8.00
6 □ □ £7.50
7 □ □ £7.00
8 □ □ £6.50
9 □ □ £6.00
10 □ □ £5.50
11 □ □ £5.00
12 □ □ £4.50
13 □ □ £4.00
14 □ □ £3.50
15 □ □ £3.00
16 □ □ £2.50
17 □ □ £2.00
18 □ □ £1.50
19 □ □ £1.00
20 □ □ £0.50
Figure 1: Our Incentivised Confidence Elicitation Tool
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For each row of the table please choose either Option A or B
Row
Option A:
Lottery
Your Choice Option B:
Guaranteed amount ofA B
1
50% chance of £10.00
and
50% chance of £0.00
□ □ £10.00
2 □ □ £9.50
3 □ □ £9.00
4 □ □ £8.50
5 □ □ £8.00
6 □ □ £7.50
7 □ □ £7.00
8 □ □ £6.50
9 □ □ £6.00
10 □ □ £5.50
11 □ □ £5.00
12 □ □ £4.50
13 □ □ £4.00
14 □ □ £3.50
15 □ □ £3.00
16 □ □ £2.50
17 □ □ £2.00
18 □ □ £1.50
19 □ □ £1.00
20 □ □ £0.50
Figure 2: Sample Table for Risk Attitude Elicitation (Part 1 of the
Experiment)
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Figure 3: Confidence and Success
Top panels: Each dot represents a question. For a given question, Bias = (Average Confidence) –
(Average Success) across subjects. Average Bias is the mean across questions and the reported
p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the mean of the distribution of biases equals zero. Bottom
panels: Each dot represents a subject. For a given subject, Bias = (Average Confidence) –
(Average Success) across questions. Average Bias is the mean across subjects and the reported
p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that the mean of the distribution of biases equals zero.
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The Mean of the Estimated Parameters
for Nottingham and Zurich Samples
Nottingham
(n=86)
Zurich
(n=138)
ߙோ஽௎ 1.047 (0.22) 1.104 (0.29)
ߚ 0.729 (0.16) 0.884 (0.17)
ߛ 0.477 (0.07) 0.533 (0.10)
Mean standard errors are in parentheses0
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Figure 4: Estimates of Risk Preference Parameters.
The plot is the weighting function based on the median estimates of ߚ and ߛof the sample
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Figure 5: Risk Adjusted Confidence and Success
Each dot represents a question. For a given question, Bias = (Average Confidence –
Average Success) across subjects. Average bias is the mean across all questions and the
reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test that mean of distribution of biases is zero.
Absolute Bias = Absolute (Average Confidence – Average Success) across subjects.
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Tables
Table 1: Lotteries Used in Part 1 of the Experiment
Lottery p x1 x2 Lottery p x1 x2
1 0.05 £4 £0 14 0.5 £10 £0
2 0.05 £8 £2 15 0.5 £10 £4
3 0.05 £10 £4 16 0.5 £30 £0
4 0.05 £30 £10 17 0.75 £4 £0
5 0.1 £2 £0 18 0.75 £8 £2
6 0.1 £4 £2 19 0.75 £10 £4
7 0.1 £10 £0 20 0.9 £2 £0
8 0.25 £4 £0 21 0.9 £4 £2
9 0.25 £8 £2 22 0.9 £10 0
10 0.25 £10 £4 23 0.95 £4 £0
11 0.5 £2 £0 24 0.95 £8 £2
12 0.5 £4 £2 25 0.95 £10 £4
13 0.5 £8 £2
p denotes the probability of the first outcome, x1
Table 2: Dependant Variable Average Reported Confidence
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
ࢻ .125***
(0.05)
.124**
(0.055)
ࢼ .078
(0.05)
.097
(0.060)
ࢽ .096**
(0.051)
.109**
(0.054)
Average Success .029
(0.112)
Female -.037
(0.028)
Age -.013
(0.009)
Ambig. Averse -.013
(0.032)
Constant .453***
(.078)
.704***
(.202)
ࡾഥ૛ .203 .251
࢔ 45 43
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels
Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained by the bootstrap
method with 1,000 replications.
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Appendix A: City quiz questions
(The percentages of correctly given answers are in parenthesis.)
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (59.6%)
□ Athens, Greece □ Amsterdam, Netherlands
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (23.2%)
□ Philadelphia, USA □ Havana, Cuba
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (63.5%)
□ Los Angeles, USA □ Kolkata, India
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (38.1%)
□ Rome, Italy □ Lima, Peru
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (59.7%)
□ Cairo, Egypt □ Brasilia, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (57.9%)
□ Tehran, Iran □ Seattle, USA
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (74.1%)
□Warsaw, Poland □ Nairobi, Kenya
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (57.2%)
□ San Diego, California, USA □ Dallas, Texas, USA
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (83.8%)
□ Buenos Aires, Argentina □ Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (45.9%)
□ Seoul, South Korea □Singapore, Singapore
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (96.5%)
□ Cairo, Egypt □ Shanghai, China
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (58.4%)
□ Istanbul, Turkey □ Sydney, Australia
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Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (81.3%)
□ Lima, Peru □ Sao Paolo, Brazil
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (92.8%)
□ Dubai, United Arab Emirates □ Tokyo, Japan
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (92.8%)
□Mumbai, India □ Berlin, Germany
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (75.4%)
□ Paris, France □Mexico City, Mexico
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (46.1%)
□ Budapest, Hungary □ Caracas, Venezuela
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (78.2%)
□Milan, Italy □Malaga, Spain
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (69.2%)
□ Coventry, UK □ Leicester, UK
Which of the following two cities has the larger population? (65.3%)
□ Oslo, Norway □ Stockholm, Sweden
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Appendix B: Post Study Questionnaire
1) What is your sex? □Male □ Female
2) What is your age? _____________
3) [Ellsberg’s Urn Problem:]
Suppose that you are shown a bag which contains 90 balls. Of these, 30 are red. The remaining 60
balls are some mixture of black and yellow, but you do not know what the mixture is. One ball is
to be drawn at random from the bag. You are asked to choose one of two options: Option I will
give you £10 if a red ball is drawn, while Option II will give you £10 if a black ball is drawn. This
choice may be written as follows:
Red Black Yellow
□ Option I £10 £0 £0
□ Option II £0 £10 £0
Which would you choose? Please tick the corresponding box.
Now suppose, instead, that you are offered a different choice of options, defined in terms of the
same draw of a ball from the same bag. You must choose one of Options III and IV:
Red Black Yellow
□ Option III £10 £0 £10
□ Option IV £0 £10 £10
Which would you choose now? Please tick the corresponding box.
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Table B1: Summary Statistics of Descriptive Variables, n=86
Scale Mean Std Error
Female Binary 0 or 1 0.44 0.50
Age Numeric Continuous 20.2 2.17
Ambiguity
attitude*
Qualitative Ambig. averse,
seeking, or neutral
Averse: 55
Seeking: 1
Neutral 30
*Subjects classified according to responses in Ellsberg problems in post study questionnaire
as follows: ambiguity averse (Options I and IV chosen); ambiguity seeking (Options II and
III); ambiguity neutral (Options I and III or Options II and IV).
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Appendix C: Histograms of Average Reported Confidence and ConfEV (Subject Level)
Appendix D: Histograms of Risk Preference Parameters
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Appendix E: Average Switch Point as an Alternative Risk Measure
Table E1: Dependant Variable Average Reported Confidence
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2
Average Switch Point 0.054**
(0.024)
0.089***
(0.028)
Average Success 0.032
(0.105)
Female -0.037
(0.029)
Age -0.024***
(0.008)
Ambig. Averse -0.014
(0.033)
Constant 0.457***
(0.102)
0.819***
(0.164)
ࡾഥ૛ 0.087 0.224
࢔ 44 41
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance levels
Dependent variable is the individual’s average switch point in Part 1 of the
experiment. Standard errors (in parentheses).
